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Abstract
The goal of this thesis is to instantiate random oracles without losing security proven
in the random oracle model. It is well known that this is not possible with any function
family, as rst shown by Halevi et al. (IACR’1998). Therefore, we will resort to interaction,
but reduce the overhead created by it as well as we can.
In order to keep the interaction needed to a minimum, we introduce a novel ideal model
called veri able random oracle model. In addition to a random oracle RO, this model
also includes a veri cation oracle, which for input (𝑥, ℎ) returns 1 if RO(𝑥) = ℎ and 0
otherwise. We then continue to present two concrete instantiations for veri able random
oracles, one of which does not use trusted parties. Additionally, we reduce the network
overhead (i.e. combined message size needed).
When used with the Fiat-Shamir transformation, these instantiations preserve the simula-
tion-sound extractability property. The prover of the Fiat-Shamir transformation unfortu-
nately loses its non-interactivity. However, the veri er remains non-interactive, as the
instantiations for the verify oracle are non-interactive. The proofs for these claims make




Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, RandomOracle zu instanziieren, ohne dabei Sicherheit zu verlieren,
die im Random Oracle Modell bewiesen wurde. Das dies mit Funktionsfamilien nicht geht
ist eine wohl bekannte Aussage, die zuerst von Halevi et al. (IACR’1998) gezeigt wurde. Wir
werden aus diesem Grund auf Interaktion zurückgreifen, aber versuchen, den erzeugten
Overhead möglichst zu reduzieren.
Um möglichst wenig zu Interagieren führen wir ein neues ideales Modell mit Namen
Veriable Random Oracle ein. Dieses Modell bietet zusätzlich zum Random Oracle ein
Veri kations-Orakel, welches bei Eingabe (𝑥, ℎ) 1 ausgibt, falls RO(𝑥) = ℎ und anderenfalls
0. Wir stellen danach zwei konkrete Instanziierungen für Veri able Random Oracle vor,
von denen eine keine vertrauenswürdige Party benötigt. Zusätzlich reduzieren wir den
Netzwerk-Overhead (also die Gesamtgröße der verwendeten Nachrichten).
Wenn wir unsere Instanziierungen zusammen mit der Fiat-Shamir Transformation verwen-
den, bleibt die Simulation-Soundness Extractability Eigenschaft erhalten. Der Beweiser der
Fiat-Shamir Transformation verliert leider seine nicht-Interaktivität. Der Veri zierer bleibt
jedoch Nicht-interaktiv, da die Instanziierungen des Veri kations-Orakels nicht-interaktiv
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Our steps to nd an instantiation for random oracles are motivated in section 1.1. After-
wards, in section 1.2 we set a concrete, detailed goal. We present existing research with a
similar focus in section 1.3, and summarize our contribution in section 1.4.
1.1 Motivation
The random oracle model was rst explicitly mentioned in 1993 [3]. Whether or not
security in the random oracle model can indicate security in practice has been discussed
ever since. In this section we will explain how these discussions, and the problem with
random oracles at their core, motivate this thesis.
The RandomOracle Model A random oracle implements a function randomly drawn from
all functions with a suitable domain and codomain, usually {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}𝑙 for some
length 𝑙 depending on the context. In the random oracle model (ROM), all parties have
access to a random oracle. In order to translate a scheme from the ROM to other models,
the random oracle in most cases is replaced by a family of hash functions. Because of this,
random oracles are often viewed as over-idealisations of the functionality of cryptographic
hash functions.
The Discussion about the RandomOracle Model The existence of a random oracle is a very
strong assumption. In fact Halevi et al. demonstrated the existence of schemes secure
in the ROM but insecure for any family of functions replacing the random oracle [20].
Critics of the ROM therefore argue that the ROM is an un t heuristic for the security of
cryptographic hash functions, and can at most be used as a sanity check. Advocates reply
that in 20 years of practice not a single scheme has been successfully attacked as a result
of this discrepancy [23]. They argue that all schemes broken because of their use of a
random oracle in their proof of security are arti cially constructed. For example, the rst
such scheme [20] has a case that can never occur in the ROM designed to publish the
private key.
Programmability On top of that, there are many cases where random oracles have been
given additional properties. The most common of these properties is programmability. In
security reductions for chosen inputs the output of a programmable random oracle can be
dictated by an adversary or other designated party. There are cases where hash functions
with limited programmability provide security in the standard model [31, 21]. However,
programmability cannot be achieved in the standard model in general, which worsens the
discrepancy between security in the ROM and standard model.
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Our Approach All negative results about bringing security from the ROM to the standard
model (e.g. [20, 1, 18]) are based on replacing the random oracle with a family of functions.
Fortunately there are other structures that can be used. In this thesis we analyse the use
of interactive protocols to sidestep these negative results. This is often undesired, as it
entails the use of a public party and the necessity to be online. However this can still be
relevant in cases where proven security is of high importance.
TheFiat-ShamirTransformation The Fiat-Shamir transformation [16] was introduced as an
ecient identi cation scheme supporting multiple users and without requiring interaction
or shared public keys. Since then, di erent versions of the Fiat-Shamir transformation
have been used in various other scenarios. In fact there are so many results even a quick
search yields research about
• security of the scheme, including for post-quantum settings [6, 15, 11, 29, 14, 24],
• signature schemes with additional functionality or properties [4, 2, 26, 27],
• smartcard and passport implementations of the scheme [12, 22],
• variants and similar schemes [17, 5, 28].
Especially the use as e cient non-interactive, zero-knowledge proof system gave the
Fiat-Shamir transformation appeal across a wide variety of use cases.
Security of the Fiat-Shamir Transformation A variant of the Fiat-Shamir transformation
is secure in the random oracle model [6] with programmability. However, at least some
instances are not secure for any function family used
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[18]. Because of its popularity
and lack of proven security in the standard model the Fiat-Shamir transformation is a
tting scenario for us to further investigate. We will use the notion of simulation-sound
extractability as a benchmark for our results. All protocols introduced in chapter 3 of this
thesis will preserve this property when replacing the random oracle. A formal de nition
of all important notions can be found in chapter 2.
Optimization One of the important bene ts of the Fiat-Shamir transformation is its non-
interactivity. We will unfortunately lose this trait, when instantiating the random oracle
with an interactive protocol. However, we will keep the interaction as limited as possible.
In order to do so, we make it possible to verify values returned by the random oracle
without interaction. Formally, we will add a second ideal functionality to the random
oracle model, and introduce the novel notion of veri able random oracles. This change
helps to reduce the number of calls to the RO. We will further reduce the amount of
interaction by reducing the size of messages sent.
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Strictly speaking these results concern di erent notions of security (namely simulation-sound extractability
and simulation soundness). The negative result still raises the question whether or not the security of




The goal of this thesis is to nd an instantiation of the random oracle used in the simulation-
sound extractability proof of the Fiat-Shamir transformation (see section 2.3). In the
rst step we will introduce veri able random oracles and use them to replace random
oracles. This step is taken to make more e cient instantiations possible. We then try to
nd an instantiation which preserves the security of the original ROM proof with only
small adjustments to the proof. A noteworthy challenge of this goal is the modelling
of programmability for the instantiation. These instantiations will contain one or more
additional parties, which provide the functionality of the veri able random oracle. The
remainder of this section describes additional desired qualities. After presenting the rst
instantiation we will adapt it in order to optimize these qualities. We will also prove any
claims made about the security of our instantiations.
Weaken Assumptions A common way to describe a random oracle is through a lazy-
evaluating, trusted party. This is technically a secure instantiation of a random oracle.
However, having a trusted party is an utopian assumption. Therefore, our goal is to nd an
instantiation with assumptions which are as weak as possible. We will still rely on trusted
parties at rst, in order to have a simpler example. The combination of programmability
and the possibility of compromised parties was one of the harder challenges to gure out
and adds the most complexity to the instantiation.
Reducing the Network Overhead As described before, we want to minimize the amount
of network overhead created by our instantiation. This not only includes the amount of
queries to the veri able random oracle. It also means minimizing
• the amount of rounds needed to answer one query,
• the combined size of messages sent, and
• the amount of messages between di erent parties of the veri able random oracle,
and the combined size of these messages.
We will also reason about lower bounds for these quantities, though not in a formal
manner.
1.3 RelatedWork
In general, random oracles cannot be instantiated with function families as proven by
Halevi et al. [20]. Apart from this negative result, and the surrounding discussion, there
are surprisingly few results about instantiating random oracles. In this section we discuss
related research.
Verifiable Random Functions Veri able random functions were rst introduced by Micali
et al. [25] and rst implemented by Dodis [13]. Their core idea is very similar to our
notion of veri able random oracles. Veri able random functions can be used to instantiate
random oracles with the help of an additional party, and there are distributed variants
[13] to tackle corruption. However, due to the deterministic nature of veri able random
functions it is not possible to program them.
3
1 Introduction
Simulatable Verifiable Random Functions There are also veriable random functions that
include a simulator which can generate real looking proofs [9]. With these simulated
proofs it is possible to convince other parties of values di erent from the honest computed
ones. This can in some scenarios replace programmability, but requires a setup with
trusted party.
Trusted Party Implementation There are rare cases, where random oracles can be realized
with the use of a trusted party. For example, a trusted platform module could provide
a (pseudo) random oracle to the system it is part of [19]. This is interesting, as out
instantiations could be used in similar setups.
1.4 Contribution
We introduce a novel notion of veri able random oracles which are a variant of random
oracles that output a proof of correct evaluation alongside the random query result. This
notion is then used to reduce overhead of queries to instantiations of the oracle. Next,
we present instantiations of a veri able random oracle which preserve security proven in
the ROM, even if programmability is required. New proofs of security can be gained by
slightly adjusting the ROM proof to account for the di erent structure of the veri able
random oracle.
Our nal instantiation uses four parties and is secure if at most one of them is corrupted
(or faulty). This instantiation can be generalized to allow for any number 𝑛 of corrupted
parties, but requires a signi cant amount of total parties (3𝑛 + 1). We also demonstrate the
capability of our instantiations by providing proofs for the simulation-sound extractability
property of the Fiat-Shamir transformation. These proofs only need small adjustment
to the respective proof in the ROM. In general, simulation-sound extractability could
previously not be transferred to the standard model.
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2 Preliminaries
In this chapter we will explain any formal notations and notions needed to understand
the content of this thesis. We begin in section 2.1 with the foundations, and introduce
the Fiat-Shamir transformation which is central to the thesis afterwards in section 2.2. In
section 2.3 we explain and prove an important property of the Fiat-Shamir transformation,
namely simulation-sound extractability. This property and its proof is used throughout
this thesis as important use case.
2.1 Basic Definitions and Notation
This section explains the mathematical foundations used in this thesis, and covers impor-
tant notations. Anyone familiar with theoretical computer science, especially cryptography,
can likely skip this section.
Security Parameter Throughout the paper we will often implicitly talk about a security
parameter _. The security parameter is a natural number which indicates the asymptotic
security of a cryptographic scheme. The higher _ is, the lower the probability of any
adversary breaking the security of the scheme. Use of such a parameter, as well as omitting
it, is common practice. Usually, cryptographic schemes have a setup algorithm Setup(_)
dependent on _, that outputs descriptions of all other algorithms of the scheme. We also
sometimes chose a concrete member 𝑓_ of a family of e.g. functions 𝐹 with _. We can
arbitrarily x the security parameter and with it the algorithms output by Setup. Security
properties might still be dependent on _, e.g. through the use of negligible functions as
described in the next paragraph.
Polynomial, Negligible, andOverwhelming We call a function 𝑓 polynomial (in the security
parameter), if there is a polynomial 𝑃 such that 𝑓 (_) ≤ 𝑃 (_) for any _ ∈ N. We call 𝑓
negligible (in the security parameter), if there exists a point 𝑛 so that for all _ ≥ 𝑛 it holds
that 𝑓 (_) ≤ 1
𝑃 (_) . Furthermore, we call 𝑓 overwhelming (in the security parameter), if
there exists a negligible function 𝑔 so that 𝑓 (_) ≥ 1 − 𝑔(_) for any _ ∈ N. It will become
apparent in the rest of this section how we use these three properties.
Algorithms In our model of computation all algorithms are Turing machines. However
we will abstract from that fact, as is common in literature. Algorithms, like functions, have
an input and an output. However, algorithms may use randomness which may result in
di erent outputs for identical inputs. Most algorithms in this thesis run in polynomial time,
meaning the maximum amount of steps taken is restricted from above by a polynomial
in _. We will call such algorithms probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms. The
notation for the result of an algorithm A with input 𝑥 is A(𝑥), similar to the notation of
functions. We will de ne algorithms through step-by-step instructions called their code.
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Parties and Interaction All entities taking part in a cryptographic scheme are modelled
as parties. A party knows one or more algorithms which they can execute, and has a
memory shared between all of them. We model the memory as a map and write mem[𝑥]
for access to storage location 𝑥 . Parties can provide interfaces to other parties to dene
possible interactions. Other parties can call such an interface by sending a message. The
providing party then executes an algorithm linked to the interface with the input speci ed
by the call message, and sends a message with the answer back to the caller. We often do
not distinguish between a party, an interface, and an algorithm, unless it is necessary to
prevent ambiguity. Otherwise we write P.A(𝑥) for the interface executing algorithm A
with input 𝑥 on party P.
Protocols We also allow two algorithms of di erent parties to send messages between
each other before making an output. Behaviour of such codependent algorithms is de ned
in protocols. The sequence of all messages of a protocol is called a transcript. We write
〈A(𝑥),B(𝑦)〉 for the output of the protocol between algorithms A and B with inputs
𝑥 and 𝑦 respectively. This notation will also be used with sets of algorithms, simply
meaning all algorithms of the set take part in the protocol. During a protocol, we also
write 𝑥 ← B(𝑦) meaning 𝑦 is sent to B, and the answer is stored in 𝑥 . We use← instead
of = to clarify the call is part of a protocol.
Game Based Security Notions of security are often described with the help of games.
Games de ne a situation in which multiple parties interact. They include an arbitrary but
xed adversary and de ne a condition in which the adversary wins. We will present games
in the form of algorithms executing the speci ed interaction, returning 1 if the adversary
won, and 0 otherwise. At the beginning of a game, the randomness of all participating
parties is uniformly chosen. We denote a uniform choice for 𝑥 from elements of the set 𝑆 as
𝑥
$← 𝑆 . A scheme is secure if for all adversaries the probability (taken over all randomness)
to win the game is negligible.
Game Hops Sometimes it is easier to prove security for a game that is slightly di erent
then the one stated in the security notion. In such a case, one can make an additional
proof showing that the probability of di erent outcomes in the two games is negligible.
This strategy is called making game hops, as you can create a sequence of these games
and “hop” from one to the next. We use game hops to take complexity out of long proofs.
Black Box Access and Oracles The sort of interaction, where a party provides an input and
receives an output without knowing the process in between is called black box access. For
example, parties providing interfaces provide black box access to the associated algorithm.
We denote thatA has black box access to B asAB . Black boxes can be described with the
properties of the provided functionality rather than concrete code. This is possible, even if
no code has the speci ed properties. For this reason, we call entities providing black box
access to such a functionality an oracle. Oracles are useful tools in security proofs.
Rewindability In addition to regular access to a black box, a party can have rewinding
access to a black box. This allows a party to undo steps of the execution of the black box
(without it noticing or remembering). In this thesis, we model this ability by allowing to
restart the interaction. These de nitions are equivalent, as the interaction can be replayed
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from the start to any point
1
. The intention is to have control over the algorithm in the
black box without knowing its code.
RandomOracles and Programmability The most common oracle in cryptography is the
random oracle. Random oracles behave like a function randomly drawn from the set
of all functions with a suitable domain and codomain, and are often used to idealize
cryptographic hash functions. In the random oracle model (ROM) all parties have access
to the same random oracle. Sometimes, a party is allowed to control a random oracle
by dictating its output. We refer to this as programming the oracle. In most cases a
programming party acts exactly like the random oracle with only few exceptions. Therefore,
we specify the behaviour of a programmed random oracle by specifying the dierence to
the non-programmed random oracle. We write RO.prgm(𝑥, ℎ) if the result of RO on input
𝑥 is changed to ℎ.
Trusted Parties and Corruption Some security notions can give the adversary the ability
to corrupt one or more parties. Corruption happens once at the beginning of a game and
follows rules de ned by the security notion. The only rules used in this paper limit the
number of corrupted parties. A corrupted party shares all information with the adversary.
It does not make decisions, but passes all messages to the adversary, who can dictate the
answers. Parties which cannot be corrupted are called trusted parties. It is possible, but
not necessary for an untrusted party to be corrupted.
Bottom and Timeouts An algorithm can return a special symbol ⊥ (named bottom) to
signal it is not able to make a successful output. When de ning algorithms, we often ignore
the possibility of receiving ⊥ as result of calls. If an algorithm would do any computation
with ⊥, it implicitly returns ⊥ as well, or 0 if it is some kind of veri cation algorithm. This
makes algorithms easier to understand by focusing on their intended behaviour. We also
want to consider the possibility of parties not giving an answer due to being corrupted or
otherwise faulty. In practice such behaviour would be handled by timeouts. We instead
model receiving no answer as another special symbol timeout. The error handling for
timeout works the same as for ⊥.
2.2 The Fiat-Shamir Transformation
This section introduces sigma protocols and zero-knowledge proofs. It explain how the
Fiat-Shamir transformation changes sigma protocols to be zero-knowledge.
SigmaProtocols Sigma protocols (or Σ-protocols) [10] are a way for a prover P to convince
a veri er V of a statement 𝑥 . The important part is that P does not give V enough
information to prove 𝑥 to other parties. In order to achieve this, P gains an additional input
𝑤 called witness for 𝑥 . In the protocol, P sends a commitment a to V to receive a challenge
𝑐 . Pwill then send a response 𝑧 to V, who outputs either 1 to accept the proof, or 0 to reject
the proof. The reason, why V cannot reuse the proof to convince other parties is that these
parties will most likely choose another challenge 𝑐′ that V is not able to answer. Formally,
1




this property is described as a simulator Sim with the ability to create real looking proof
conversations.
Denition 1 (Sigma Protocol). Let
• 𝑅 ⊆ 𝑋 ×𝑊 be a witness relation,
• 𝐿𝑅 = {𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 | ∃𝑤 ∈𝑊 .(𝑥,𝑤) ∈ 𝑅} be the associated language,
• P and V be interactive, stateful PPT algorithms, and
• 𝐶 be a set called challenge space.
For public input 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 , and input𝑤 ∈𝑊 to P, the interaction between the two algorithms






𝑧 return Vfy(𝑥, (a, 𝑐, 𝑧))
where Vfy takes a potential word 𝑥 and a transcript as inputs and maps them to 1 or 0,
accepting or rejecting the proof respectively. The tuple (P,V) is called Σ-protocol for 𝑅, if the
following properties are ful lled:
• Completeness: For all input values (𝑥,𝑤) ∈ 𝑅 the honest prover will always convince
the honest veri er i.e. 〈P(𝑥,𝑤),V(𝑥)〉 = 1.
• Special Soundness: There exists a polynomial-time extractor Ext that given a word
𝑥 and two accepting transcripts (a, 𝑐, 𝑧) and (a, 𝑐′, 𝑧′) with equal commitments but
di erent challenges (𝑐 ≠ 𝑐′) always outputs a witness𝑤 ∈𝑊 such that (𝑥,𝑤) ∈ 𝑅.
• Special Honest-Veri er Zero-Knowledge: There exists a PPT simulator Sim that, given
𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 and 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 , always outputs a and 𝑧 such that (a, 𝑐, 𝑧) has the same distribution
as transcripts between the honest P and V.
We will also often require Σ-protocols to have a super-polynomial challenge space and the
strict soundness property as introduced by Unruh [30], meaning for all 𝑥 , a, and 𝑐 there is
at most one verifying 𝑧 i.e.
∀𝑥, a, 𝑐 .Vfy(𝑥, (a, 𝑐, 𝑧)) ∧ Vfy(𝑥, (a, 𝑐, 𝑧′)) ⇒ 𝑧 = 𝑧′.
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Zero-Knowledge One potential shortcoming of the Σ-protocol is that the simulator only
works for the honest verier. Use of malicious veri ers may break the zero-knowledge
property and give additional information about 𝑥 (other than 𝑥 ∈ 𝐿𝑅). A protocol needs to
have a simulator for each veri er in order to be zero-knowledge.
De nition 2 (Zero-Knowledge). Let
• 𝑅 and 𝐿𝑅 be de ned as in de nition 1, and
• P and V be interactive, stateful PPT algorithms with the completeness property of
de nition 1.
(P,V) is called a zero-knowledge proof system (ZK) if for each malicious PPT veri er V∗
there exists a PPT simulator SimV∗ that, given 𝑥 , always outputs a transcript that has the
same distribution as transcripts between P and V∗.
The upcoming Fiat-Shamir transformation changes a Σ-protocol in a way that makes it
zero-knowledge in the ROM when giving SimV∗ programming access to the random oracle.
The Fiat-Shamir Transformation Fiat and Shamir were the rst to transform a Σ-protocol
to create an one-round (non-interactive) zero-knowledge proof system [16]. Since then,
some variants and similar transformations like the Fischlin transformation [17] have been
published. In this thesis we will use the strong Fiat-Shamir transformation as described
by Bernhard et al. [6]. It replaces the challenge from the Σ-protocol by querying (𝑥, a) to
a random oracle, instead of V drawing it. As P can now compute the challenge itself, no
interaction with V is needed anymore.
De nition 3 (Fiat-Shamir Transformation). Let
• Σ = (PΣ,VΣ) be a Σ-protocol,
• SimΣ be the special honest-veri er zero-knowledge simulator of Σ,
• RO : 𝑋 ×𝐴→ 𝐶 be a random oracle, and
• Vfy be the algorithm VΣ uses to verify.
The Fiat-Shamir transformation of Σ (𝐹𝑆 (Σ)) in the random oracle model is de ned by these
two polynomial time algorithms:
P(𝑥,𝑤):
1 : a← PΣ (𝑥,𝑤)
2 : 𝑐 = RO(𝑥, a)
3 : 𝑧 ← PΣ (𝑐)
4 : return (a, 𝑐, 𝑧)
V(𝑥, (a, 𝑐, 𝑧)):
1 : if 𝑐 ≠ RO(𝑥, a):
2 : return 0






2 : (a, 𝑧) = SimΣ (𝑥, 𝑐)
3 : RO.prgm((𝑥, a), 𝑐)
4 : return (a, 𝑐, 𝑧)
Figure 2.1: The zero-knowledge simulator for the Fiat-Shamir transformation.
In denition 3, P and V are not described through their interaction, as there is only a single
message from P to V. Instead, V receives the output of P as an input. This non-interactive
nature of the Fiat-Shamir transformation is an important advantage over interactive
schemes, as it can be utilized in more settings. It is also the reason why it is ZK, as the
veri er does not make decisions anymore, and therefore malicious veri ers cannot diverge
from the honest one. However, the simulator needs programming access to RO in order to
work, as shown in gure 2.1.
2.3 Simulation-Sound Extractability
A very strong property of the Fiat-Shamir transformation is simulation-sound extractability
[6]. It is a combination of the two properties simulation soundness and extractability. Here
are intuitive descriptions of them, before we go into the formal de nition of simulation-
sound extractability:
Extractability. AZK proof system is extractable if there exists an algorithm called extractor
that can output witnesses using access to any successful malicious prover. You may think
about extractability this way: Any successful malicious prover has the ability to compute
witnesses.
Simulation Soundness. A ZK proof system is simulation sound, if no PPT adversary with
access to the ZK-simulator can forge proofs for false statements with more then negligible
probability.
Simulation-sound extractability combines these properties as follows: The extractor of the
extractability de nition uses an adversary for simulation soundness instead of a malicious
prover. The formal de nition is phrased in a way that the adversary only wins if it is not
possible to extract a witness from it:
De nition 4 (Simulation-Sound Extractability in the ROM). Let
• RO be a random oracle,
• Π be a ZK proof system, and
• Sim be the ZK-simulator of Π.
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Π is simulation-sound extractable (SSE) in the random oracle model if there exists an
extractor Ext for which no PPT adversaryA can win the following game with non-negligible
probability, and the expected runtime of Ext in the game is polynomial.
Game SSE:
1 : (𝑥, 𝜋) = ASim,RO()
2 : 𝑀 = {(𝑥, 𝜋) | Sim(𝑥) returned 𝜋 to A}
3 : 𝑤 = ExtA,RO(𝑥, 𝜋)
4 : return Vfy(𝑥, 𝜋) ∧ (𝑥, 𝜋) ∉𝑀 ∧ (𝑥,𝑤) ∉𝑅
In this game, Ext has rewinding access to A and can program RO. Additionally, whenever
A is being rewound, Sim rewinds with it, and both algorithms use the same randomness as
before.
A successful adversary needs to forge a new proof for some 𝑥 in a way that the extractor
is unable to nd a witness for 𝑥 . Again, you might think about this property the following
way: There is no successful attack using a zero knowledge simulator that could not also
nd a witness. This directly implies soundness, as nding a witness𝑤 for a value not in
the language 𝑥 ∉ 𝐿 is not possible.
Simulation-Sound Extractability of the Fiat-Shamir Transformation Over the course of
the thesis, we will refer back to the following theorem 1 and its proof, as we use it as
an example for the application of our results. To be more precise, we will replace the
random oracle in the proof with our veri able random oracle instantiations and prove the
preservation of simulation-sound extractability. The main ideas for the proof come from
the forking lemmas of Bellare et al. [2] and Bootle et al. [8]. However, as there are many
similar, but non-equivalent notions of simulation-extractability, it was necessary to create
a detailed proof for the version we use.
Theorem 1. The Fiat-Shamir transformation of a strictly sound Σ-protocol with super-
polynomial challenge space is simulation-sound extractable in the random oracle model.
The Extractor The extractor Ext used in the following proof utilizes the special soundness
extractor ExtΣ required of the underlying Σ-protocol. When given a statement 𝑥 with two
accepting transcripts with the same commitment and di erent challenges, ExtΣ outputs
a witness for 𝑥 . The rst of the transcripts used by Ext to obtain the witness is the one
the adversary outputs in the initial run. The second transcript is gained from additional
executions of A after carefully reprogramming the random oracle as described in gure
2.2. For technical reasons of the proof of theorem 1, Ext tries at most
√︁
|𝐶 | times to nd
a second accepting transcript. The set 𝑀 contains all outputs of Sim to A in the initial
run, as in Game SSE. Ext can compute𝑀 by simply restarting A and Sim and executing
the initial run again. Before every execution of line 6, Ext restarts A and Sim, so the
only di erence to the initial run is the value of RO(𝑥, a). Therefore, all runs of A diverge
only after RO(𝑥, a) is queried for the rst time. Ext nds the required second transcript
by executing A with di erent values for RO(𝑥, a) until a second challenge is answered
successfully. It remains to be shown that Ext runs in expected polynomial time and the
probability of any A succeeding is negligible.
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ExtA,RO(𝑥, (a, 𝑐, 𝑧)):
1 : if ¬V(𝑥, (a, 𝑐, 𝑧)) ∨ (𝑥, (a, 𝑐, 𝑧)) ∈ 𝑀 :
2 : return ⊥ # A failed





5 : RO.prgm((𝑥, a), 𝑐)
6 : (𝑥 ′, (a′, 𝑐 ′, 𝑧 ′)) = ASim,RO()
7 : until 𝑥 ′ = 𝑥 ∧ a′ = a ∧ V(𝑥 ′, (a′, 𝑐 ′, 𝑧 ′))
8 : return ExtΣ (𝑥, (a, 𝑐, 𝑧), (a, 𝑐 ′, 𝑧 ′))
Figure 2.2: The extractor used in the SSE proof for the Fiat-Shamir transformation.
Some additional Setup In the two following proofs, we will x the randomness used by
A and Sim to arbitrary values. All probabilities are taken over the randomness of RO and
the choice of 𝑐 in line 4 of the extractor. Let 𝑐𝑖 be the result of the 𝑖-th query to RO. Because
RO is uniformly random, its randomness can be depicted as a sequence of unique random
choices R = (𝑐1, . . . , 𝑐P), one for each query2. P is the maximum number of queries made
to RO, and is polynomial, as all algorithms able to send queries are polynomially time
bound. For any choice 𝑐𝑖 , we can then split the probability of any event E by explicitly




Pr[𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐] · Pr[E | 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐 ]
We will do so later for all but one 𝑖 , which is why we introduce some notation for it now.
Let
• R𝑖 = (𝑐1, . . . , 𝑐𝑖−1, 𝑐𝑖+1, . . . , 𝑐P) be the randomness of RO except for the choice of 𝑐𝑖 ,
• EinitA is successful in the initial run of Game SSE i.e. Vfy(𝑥, 𝜋) ∧ (𝑥, 𝜋) ∉ 𝑀 (see
de nition 4), and
• EinitA,𝑖 be the event of A being successful in the initial run and answering challenge 𝑐𝑖 .
Lemma 1. Ext runs in expected polynomial time.
Proof. The maximum amount of time any line of Ext takes to execute is polynomial. With
exception of the loop, every line is executed at most once. Therefore, it su ces to prove
that the expected number of loop iterations E[I] is polynomial. The loop is only reached








 EinitA ] .
2
If a query (𝑥, a) is made to RO multiple times, only the rst is represented by a choice 𝑐𝑖 .
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We can split this expression into a sum over the index of the successfully answered

















Pr[R𝑖 = C𝑖] · Pr
[
EinitA,𝑖




R𝑖 = C𝑖 ∧ EinitA,𝑖 ] is the expected number of loop iterations in the case where
most randomness of RO is xed (R𝑖 = C𝑖 ) andA successfully answered 𝑐𝑖 in the initial run
(EinitA,𝑖 ). Executions of A initiated by Ext will use the same randomness as the initial run.
The only di erence is that 𝑐𝑖 gets programmed randomly. This situation can be described
by R𝑖 = C𝑖 . Part of the loop exit condition (𝑥′ = 𝑥 ∧ a′ = a) can be interpreted as A
answering 𝑐𝑖 . The reason for this is the xed randomness. We know that runs can only
diverge after the 𝑖-th query to RO has been answered with 𝑐𝑖 , as this is the rst step in the
execution with un xed randomness. The rest of the exit condition, i.e. V(𝑥′, (a′, 𝑐′, 𝑧′)),
ensures that the reply to 𝑐𝑖 was successful. As there is a second break condition (max
√︁
|𝐶 |
iterations), we conclude that in each iteration, the probability to exit the loop is greater
or equal to Pr
[
EinitA,𝑖
R𝑖 = C𝑖 ] . The expected number of loop iterations can be expressed




R𝑖 = C𝑖 ∧ EinitA,𝑖 ] ≤ 1 + (1 − Pr[EinitA,𝑖 R𝑖 = C𝑖 ] ) · E[I R𝑖 = C𝑖 ∧ EinitA,𝑖 ] ,








R𝑖 = C𝑖 ] .






Pr[R𝑖 = C𝑖] · Pr
[
EinitA,𝑖
















As P is polynomial, so is the expected runtime of Ext. 
3
This argument makes the implicit assumption that 𝑐 used by the answer of A in the initial run was
received from RO and not guessed. We will attend to the corner case, in which this is not the case, after
we nish the rest of the proof for theorem 1 at the end of this section.
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Lemma 2. The probability of A succeeding in Game SSE is negligible.
Proof. In order for A to win Game SSE it has to succeed the initial run, and Ext has to
fail in nding a witness. Ext can only fail, if
1. the loop is exited because
√︁
|𝐶 | iterations have been reached, or
2. the loop is exited with “colliding challenges” 𝑐 = 𝑐 .
Let us consider for a moment an extractor Ext′ that does not stop after
√︁
|𝐶 | loop iterations.
The prior proof implies that the expected number of loop iterations E[I′] for Ext′ is also











This is the exact probability of Ext exiting the loop because
√︁
|𝐶 | iterations have been
reached. It is negligible, as E[I′] is polynomial and
√︁
|𝐶 | is super-polynomial. It remains to
be shown that the probability of a collision 𝑐 = 𝑐 is negligible. This probability is at most
the probability of drawing 𝑐 out of 𝐶 with
√︁
|𝐶 | tries. As each try has a success chance of
1





for such a collision. Because the challenge space is super-polynomial, we can derive that
this probability is also negligible. Therefore, the probability of A winning Game SSE is
negligible. 
In the proofs of both lemmas, we made the implicit assumption, thatA only answers with
challenges it queried from RO. As A has to guess a challenge when not querying it, the
probability ofA is 1|𝐶 | , which in negligible as𝐶 is super-polynomial. We can conclude that
𝐹𝑆 (Σ) is simulation-sound extractable in the random oracle model for all strictly sound
sigma protocols Σ with super-polynomial challenge space 𝐶 , as stated by theorem 1.
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In this chapter we will introduce the novel notion of veriable random oracles, and
demonstrate how they can replace random oracles. Section 3.1 explains the idea behind
the ideal veri able random oracle model and de nes it. We then present a framework for
instantiation in section 3.2 and multiple security properties. Afterwards, in section 3.3,
we instantiate a veri able random oracle with the use of a trusted party, and in section
3.4, we present an instantiation without need for a trusted party. For all instantiations, we
also provide a proof that they preserve simulation-sound extractability when instantiating
a random oracle.
3.1 The Verifiable RandomOracle Model
As explained in section 1.1, we want to nd a way to instantiate random oracles while
preserving security. In our case, security means simulation-sound extractability of the
Fiat-Shamir transformation. However, we are con dent that our instantiations will work
in other contexts as well. In this section, we will recap the motivation for the new notion
of veri able random oracles, and de ne their ideal functionality. We will also prove that
the Fiat-Shamir transformation remains simulation-sound extractable in the veri able
random oracle model in order to prepare later proofs for instantiations.
Motivation Recap In general, it is not possible to instantiate random oracles with any
function family [20]. We can bypass this negative result by using interaction in instanti-
ations. This is unfortunate, as our use case (the Fiat-Shamir transformation) and many
other scenarios aim to be non-interactive. Even though it is not possible to eliminate the
interaction completely, we can reduce it by providing additional functionality to verify
random oracle values without a query. For the Fiat-Shamir transformation, this implies
that we can at least make the veri er non-interactive. As a prover might have the same
proof veri ed by multiple veri ers, this can signi cantly reduce the network interaction
of the scheme, depending on the use case. Formally de ning a random oracle with this
functionality leads to the new notion of veri able random oracles.
Changes to the Random Oracle Model In the veri able random oracle model, all parties
gain access to these two oracles:
• HVRO, which acts exactly like a random oracle, and
• VfyVRO, which checks if HVRO maps a given query value to a given result value.
We will later make sure to instantiate VfyVRO non-interactively (meaning with a function
all parties can compute locally). The instantiation of HVRO has to include interaction
though, as mentioned in the last paragraph.
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P(𝑥,𝑤):
1 : a← PΣ (𝑥,𝑤)
2 : 𝑐 = HVRO(𝑥, a)
3 : 𝑧 ← PΣ (𝑐)
4 : return (a, 𝑐, 𝑧)
V(𝑥, (a, 𝑐, 𝑧)):
1 : if ¬VfyVRO((𝑥, a), 𝑐):
2 : return 0
3 : return Vfy(𝑥, (a, 𝑐, 𝑧))
Figure 3.1: The prover and veri er of the Fiat-Shamir transformation, adapted to be used
with the ideal veri able random oracle.
De nition 5 (Ideal Veri able Random Oracle). Let HVRO : 𝐷 → 𝐶 be a (programmable)
random oracle, and VfyVRO : 𝐷 ×𝐶 → {1, 0} be the function de ned by
VfyVRO(𝑥, ℎ) =
{
1 if HVRO(𝑥) = ℎ
0 else
.




an ideal (programmable) veri able random oracle.
Note that in this ideal scenario, programming HVRO automatically changes the output of
VfyVRO accordingly, by de nition.
Adapting Schemes for the Verifiable RandomOracle When translating schemes from the
random oracle model to the veri able random oracle model, one must decide which RO
queries to replace with HVRO queries, and which with VfyVRO computations. It might also
be necessary to send a VRO query result to a party so that the party does not have to query
it, but can verify it instead. These changes require decisions and can unfortunately not
be automated. However, this should be straightforward in most cases. In the Fiat-Shamir
transformation (see de nition 3), we only need to replace
• the explicit comparison 𝑐 ≠ RO(𝑥, a) in the veri er with VfyVRO((𝑥, a), 𝑐), and
• the occurrence of RO in the prover with HVRO,
as shown in 3.1.
Security in the Verifiable RandomOracle Model Because schemes have to be translated
manually, as argued in the last paragraph, we also need to adjust any proofs given in the
random oracle model by hand. This includes completeness, which is very easy to prove in
our case: P has not really changed, we only renamed RO to HVRO. Their de nition is the
same. V uses VfyVRO instead of an explicit check. However, the check being replaced is
the exact de nition of VfyVRO, so nothing changes. Overall, the scheme remains complete.
We also need to adjust the simulation-sound extractability proof:
Theorem 2. The Fiat-Shamir transformation of a strictly sound Σ-protocol with super-
polynomial challenge space is simulation-sound extractable in the veri able random oracle
model.
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Game SSE and Ext are both the same as in theorem 1, with the following exceptions:
• The prover and veri er are updated as described above,
• any calls to RO.prgm made by Ext are replaced by VRO.prgm, and
• A and Ext now have access to HVRO and VfyVRO instead of RO.
After a game hop, the following proof re ects the proof of theorem 1:
Proof. Let
• Game 0 be Game SSE in the VROM, and
• Game 1 be the same game, except that VfyVRO(𝑥, a, 𝑐) only returns 1 if (𝑥, a) was
queried to HVRO (and HVRO(𝑥, a) = 𝑐).
We will now show thatA behaves the same in both games, except for a negligible probabil-
ity. A is only able to behave di erently if it nds 𝑥 , a, and 𝑐 such that VfyVRO(𝑥, a, 𝑐) = 1
without queryingHVRO(𝑥, a) = 𝑐 . As this is only true for one 𝑐 out of the super-polynomial
challenge space, A has only a negligible probability of guessing correct even with a poly-
nomial amount of tries. As the probability of A behaving di erently is at most negligible,
so is the di erence in the success probability of A in the two games. In Game 1 we can
use Ext and the argumentation for theorem 1:
• If the initial run is successful, Ext xes randomness in a way that one of the challenges
queried is for (𝑥, a) from the initial run.
• When A is successful, it answers one of the P challenges queried, where P is bound
by the polynomial runtime of A.




• This implies the expected amount of loop iterations is |𝐶 |, making the expected
runtime of Ext polynomial.
• Using this and Markov’s inequality yields that the probability of exiting the loop
because
√︁
|𝐶 | tries have been reached is negligible.
• The probability of drawing the same challenge 𝑐 as in the initial run for (𝑥, a) in√︁
|𝐶 | tries is also negligible.
• These are the only two ways A can win Game 1, so the probability of that is
negligible as well.
We can conclude that the Fiat-Shamir transformation is simulation-sound extractable in
the VROM. 
The proof is only outlined here, because it follows the exact same argumentation as the
proof for theorem 1.
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3.2 A Framework for Instantiation
In this section we de ne a framework for the instantiation of veri able random oracles. The
main advantage for such a framework over directly de ning concrete instantiation is the
uni cation of security proofs. We de ne what algorithms and protocols an instantiations
consists of, and present properties for such instantiations. Afterwards, we provide a proof
that any instantiation with these properties preserve simulation-sound extractability of
the Fiat-Shamir transformation. It then su ces to prove these properties for our two
instantiations in sections 3.3 and 3.4.
Proof of Correct Evaluation There is a fundamental problem when trying to instantiate
veri able random oracles: As explained before, the goal is to instantiate VfyVRO with an
algorithm 𝓋 that can be executed locally by anyone. At the same time, we want to be able
to program the implementation of HVRO. There is no 𝓋 that can accomplish this required
behaviour without additional information. We will provide this information in the form
of a proof of correct evaluation 𝜎 ∈ 𝑆 . This value will be a side output of instantiations of
HVRO and an additional input to 𝓋.
Allowing for more complex Interaction As discussed before, the instantiation of HVRO will
be interactive. For this reason, it consists of a query algorithm 𝓆 that can be executed
by anyone, and one or more algorithms 𝒽𝑖 each provided by a di erent party P𝑖 . We
instantiate HVRO with the protocol 〈𝓆,P1.𝒽1, . . . ,P𝑛 .𝒽𝑛〉 where 𝑛 is the amount of parties
speci ed by the concrete instantiation. For brevity, we will write 𝒽𝑖 instead of P𝑖 .𝒽𝑖 . The
types of these new algorithms are:
〈𝓆(·),𝒽1, . . . ,𝒽𝑛〉 : 𝐷 → 𝐶 × 𝑆
𝓋 : 𝐷 ×𝐶 × 𝑆 → {1, 0}
It is often helpful to talk about the collective as a single algorithmℋ = (𝒽1, . . . ,𝒽𝑛). In
those cases you may think ofℋ as wrapper which only passes messages between 𝓆 and
all 𝒽𝑖 .
A Setup Algorithm Concrete instantiations may require a setup e.g. to generate keys.
Therefore, we will add an additional setup algorithm 𝓈. This setup computes information
known to all parties realised as one public key pk, and for each P𝑖 information only known
to that party realised as a secret key sk𝑖 . We can now de ne the interface for instantiation
of veri able random oracles.
De nition 6 (Veri able Random Oracle Instantiation). Let
• 𝑛 be the number of parties implementing the veri able random oracle,
• 𝓈 be a PPT setup algorithm which outputs a public key pk and 𝑛 secret keys sk =(
sk
1







, . . . ,𝒽𝑛,pk,sk𝑛
)
be a non-empty tuple of interactive PPT algorithms
each provided by a di erent party P𝑖 ,
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• 𝓆pk be an interactive PPT algorithm known to all parties,





• 𝓋pk : 𝐷 ×𝐶 × 𝑆 → {1, 0} be a non-interactive PPT algorithm known to all parties.
Then (𝓈,𝓆,ℋ,𝓋) is called veriable random oracle, if the following properties are met for
all (pk, sk) = 𝓈():









⇒ 𝓋pk(𝑥, ℎ, 𝜎).
• Pseudo Determinism: The same input 𝑥 results in the same output value ℎ, i.e.








⇒ ℎ1 = ℎ2.
• Pseudorandomness: ℎ is undistinguishable from uniform randomness, i.e. there exists
no stateful PPT adversary A that wins the following game with more then negligible
probability.
Game PR:
1 : (pk, sk) = 𝓈()
2 : 𝑥 ← A〈𝓆pk ( ·),ℋpk,sk〉,𝓋pk ()
3 : 𝑀 =
{
𝑥
 A queried 𝑥 to 〈𝓆pk(·),ℋpk,sk〉}








7 : 𝑏 ′← A(ℎ𝑏)
8 : return 𝑏 ′ = 𝑏 ∧ 𝑥 ∉ 𝑀
Forgery of Proofs The proof of correct evaluation introduced by this framework is a new
potential weakpoint. If an adversary can forge such a proof it can virtually program the
veri able random oracle. For this reason, we de ne a security property for veri able
random oracles similar to EUF-CMA for signature schemes:
De nition 7 (Weak Unforgeability). A veri able random oracle VRO = (𝓆,ℋ,𝓋) is
weakly unforgeable, if there exists no PPT adversary A that can win the following game
with non-negligible probability:
Game wUF:
1 : (𝑥, ℎ, 𝜎) ← Aℋ ()
2 : 𝑀 =
{
(𝑥, ℎ)
 〈𝓆pk(𝑥),ℋpk,sk〉 returned (ℎ, 𝜎) to A}
3 : return 𝓋pk(𝑥, ℎ, 𝜎) ∧ (𝑥, ℎ) ∉𝑀
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P(𝑥,𝑤):
1 : a← PΣ (𝑥,𝑤)
2 : (𝑐, 𝜎) = 〈𝓆(𝑥, a),ℋ〉
3 : 𝑧 ← PΣ (𝑐)
4 : return ((a, 𝑐, 𝑧), 𝜎)
V(𝑥, (a, 𝑐, 𝑧), 𝜎):
1 : if ¬𝓋((𝑥, a), 𝑐, 𝜎):
2 : return 0
3 : return Vfy(𝑥, (a, 𝑐, 𝑧))
Figure 3.2: The prover and veri er of the Fiat-Shamir transformation, adapted to be used
with a veri able random oracle instantiation.
A Programming Interface Our notation to program random oracles RO.prgm(𝑥, ℎ) re-
minds of the notation for an interface. Programming interfaces are usually more of a
way to intuitively explain programmability. However, for concrete instantiations we need
a concrete way to program it. We will describe how to program an instantiation with
pseudocode, thus taking the idea of programming interfaces a little more literally. To
de ne the exact properties of such an interface is intrinsically hard and not the subject
of this thesis. We will instead de ne what algorithms make up the interface, and what
properties we require of them in the simulation-sound extractability setting.
De nition 8 (Programming Interface). Let
• VRO = (𝓈,𝓆,ℋ,𝓋) be a veri able random oracle (with weak unforgeability), and
• (P1, . . . ,P𝑛) be the parties providing the interfaces inℋ.
We now modify VRO as described below. Let
• P be the party with programming access,








be programming interfaces, each provided
only to P by a di erent P𝑖 .
Then (prgm, PRGM) is called programming interface of VRO for P.
The properties of VRO from de nition 8 do not necessarily hold if the programming
interface is used. In fact, you would expect the programming of an oracle to break both
the pseudo determinism and the pseudorandomness of VRO. However, in cases where the
programming interface is not used, the properties hold. We will later take advantage of
this fact to proof preservation of simulation-sound extractability.
Using the Instantiation One again, we need to slightly adapt the Fiat-Shamir transforma-
tion to the form of the veri able random oracle instantiation. Speci cally, the proof of
correct evaluation has to be shared in order for queries to be veri ed, as shown in 3.2. We
also need to change Game SSE in the following way:
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• Any programming calls from the extractor are made to 〈prgm(·, ·), PRGM〉,
• A and Ext gain access to 𝓆,ℋ, and 𝓋 instead of HVRO and VfyVRO.
With these changes, we can go back to the simulation-sound extractability proof.
Simulation-Sound Extractability with Instantiations Before we begin with the simulation-
sound extractability proof, we will require another two properties from our programming
interface:
• In the executions of A initiated by Ext, with the exception of query (𝑥, a), queries
to the veriable random oracle are answered identical to queries in the initial run,
except for a negligible probability.
• A cannot distinguish between the initial run and being executed by Ext.
We will call programming interfaces with these properties suitable. Here is a outline for the
proofs, that our instantiations preserve simulation-sound extractability of the Fiat-Shamir
transformation.
Proof Outline. We make use of several game hops.
• Let Game 0 be the Game SSE using an instantiated veri able random oracle
VRO = (𝓈,𝓆,ℋ,𝓋) with weak unforgeability and suitable programming interface
(prgm, PRGM).
• In Game 1, we use a changed version of VRO with uniform randomness instead of
pseudorandomness, and show that A cannot distinguish this change. How exactly
VRO has to be changed depends on the concrete instantiation.
• In Game 2 A loses when outputting a forged proof of correct evaluation, which
only changes the success probability of A negligibly.
Using the suitability of the programming interface, we can follow the steps of the proof
for theorem 2 to prove security in Game 2. 
We will use this outline to prove security with our instantiations in the sections 3.3 and
3.4.
3.3 Instantiation with a Trusted Party
In this section, we will showcase the rst instantiation of a veri able random oracle. This
instantiation relies on a trusted party. After explaining a simple idea for instantiation, we
optimize it to have less overhead. We also eliminate the use of real randomness in order to
be closer to practice. Finally, we prove that the instantiation preserves simulation-sound
extractability of the Fiat-Shamir transformation.
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Lazy Sampling The instantiation presented in this section is inspired by the lazy sampling
interpretation of a random oracle. We only use a single trusted party P1 to implement
the functionality. P1.𝒽1 draws a random ℎ uniformly for each new query 𝑥 , saves it, and
returns it. If the same 𝑥 is queried again, 𝒽1 returns the saved ℎ. In addition, 𝒽1 outputs a
signature for the tuple (𝑥, ℎ) as proof of correct evaluation. This only yields a valid method
to prove the correct evaluation, if P1 is a trusted party. In the following paragraphs, we
will further customize this instantiation to have less network overhead.
Input Hashing The instantiation suggested in the previous paragraph uses the minimal
number of messages possible (a single message to answer a query). If we want to reduce
overhead further we need to shorten these messages. The length of the random value ℎ is
dictated by the scheme that makes use of the instantiation, meaning we have no in uence
on its length. We can reduce the length of the signature to a certain extent by choosing a
suitable signature scheme. Apart from that, we can use a cryptographic hash function H
in 𝓆 and send H(𝑥) instead of 𝑥 to 𝒽1. This can reduce the size of queries to be linear in
the security parameter
1
with negligible security loss (as proven later for theorem 3).
Using Pseudorandomness As of now, the values output by the veri able random oracle
are chosen uniformly random. Although this is allowed in theory, we cannot rely on the
ability to draw random values uniformly in practice. Therefore we will use a pseudorandom
function to chose random values. As any adversary will only notice this di erence with
negligible probability, the instantiation remains secure (as proven later for theorem 4).
This also eliminates the need to store the random values as P1 can compute them again.
Programming We still need to demonstrate how the instantiated version of the oracle can
be programmed. In order to program 〈𝓆(𝑥),𝒽1〉 to be equal to ℎ in this instantiation, the
programming party can “just tell” P1 what values to use. As P1 only interacts with hashed
values of 𝑥 , prgm computes 𝑥′ = H(𝑥) and calls P1.prgm1(𝑥′, ℎ′). The tuple is saved by
P1, which will use ℎ′ whenever 𝒽1(𝑥′) is queried. Otherwise, P1 proceeds normally. We
can now formally de ne the described instantiation:
Theorem 3 (Trusted Party Instantiation). Let
• SIG = (Gen, Sign,Vfy) be a EUF-CMA-secure signature scheme,
• PRF be a keyed pseudorandom function,
• H be a keyed, collision resistant, publicly known hash function,
• the setup algorithm 𝓈 be de ned as
1
This optimization assumes queries of big values, e.g. polynomial in the security parameter. For schemes
that query only small values, this optimization might even increase the length of query messages and
can be skipped.
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• the algorithms 𝓆, 𝒽1, and 𝓋 be dened as
𝓆pk(𝑥):
1 : 𝑥
′ = HpkH (𝑥)




1 : if 𝑥 ′ ∈ mem:
2 : ℎ = mem[𝑥 ′]
3 : else:
4 : ℎ = PRFskPRF (𝑥
′)
5 : 𝜎 = SignskSIG (𝑥
′, ℎ)
6 : return (ℎ, 𝜎)
𝓋pk(𝑥, ℎ, 𝜎):
1 : 𝑥 ′ = H(𝑥)
2 : return VfypkSIG ((𝑥
′, ℎ), 𝜎)
, and
• the programming interfaces prgm and prgm
1
be de ned as
prgmpk(𝑥, ℎ′):
1 : 𝑥








1 : mem[𝑥 ′] = ℎ′
.









We will prove this theorem by proving that (𝓈,𝓆, (𝒽1),𝓋) (without the programming
interface) is a veri able random oracle, and afterwards, that it is weakly unforgeable, and
that the programming interface is suitable.
Lemma 3. (𝓈,𝓆, (𝒽1),𝓋) is a veri able random oracle.
Proof. Without the programming interface, the greyed out branch in 𝒽1 will never be















ℎ, SignskSIG (HpkH (𝑥), ℎ)
)
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Passing these values to 𝓋 results in









We can conclude completeness. For the same input 𝑥 , the output ℎ is always computed
by PRFskPRF (HpkH (𝑥)), which is a function. Therefore, we have pseudo determinism. An
adversary A to the pseudorandomness has to either break the pseudorandomness of PRF,
or the collision resistance of H. Therefore,A is successful only with negligible probability.
With this, all requirements of a veri able random oracle are met. 
Lemma 4. (𝓈,𝓆, (𝒽1),𝓋) has weak unforgeability.
We prove this lemma by contradiction. We assume a successful adversary exists and
construct a successful EUF-CMA adversary with it:
Proof. Let
• A be any successful adversary to the weak unforgeability of (𝓈,𝓆, (𝒽1),𝓋), and
• OSign the signing oracle of Game EUF-CMA of the used signature scheme.




𝑖 )? ℎ𝑖 = PRFskPRF (𝑥𝑖)
until done (ℎ𝑖 , 𝜎𝑖) 𝜎𝑖 = OSign(𝑥 ′𝑖 , ℎ𝑖)
(𝑥, ℎ, 𝜎) 𝑥 ′ = HpkH (𝑥)
return ((𝑥 ′, ℎ), 𝜎)
In this setup,ASign answers to 𝒽1 queries fromA, and uses H and PRF from theorem 3. If
A is successful, we know that Vfy(pk, (𝑥′, ℎ), 𝜎) = 1 by de nition of 𝓋. ASign can only be
unsuccessful in such a case if it queried (𝑥′, ℎ) from OSign before. In this case, A found a
hash collision for H. The probability of this is negligible due to the collision resistance
of H. Because we required the signature scheme to be EUF-CMA secure, no such ASign








is a suitable programming interface for (𝓈,𝓆, (𝒽1),𝓋) in the
simulation-sound extractability setting.
Proof. Ext only ever calls the programming interface for (𝑥, a). Therefore, the only storage
location used is P1.mem[HpkH (𝑥, a)]. The only deviations from the original run occur if
𝑥′ = HpkH (𝑥, a) is queried to 𝒽1. This happens either if 〈𝓆(𝑥, a),ℋ〉 is called, or in the
negligible case that A found a hash collision for H. Therefore, the probability of queries
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not being answered identically as in the initial run, with the exception of query (𝑥, a), is
negligible.
It remains to be shown that A cannot distinguish between the initial run and runs started
by Ext, except with negligible probability. We know that the probability of nding any
di erence beside the value of (𝑐, 𝜎) = 〈𝓆(𝑥, a),ℋ〉 is negligible. In the initial run, 𝑐 is a
pseudorandom value gained by PRFskPRF (HpkH (𝑥, a)). In runs started byA, it is a uniformly
random value out of the challenge space. Distinguishing between those is negligible
because of the pseudorandomness of PRF. If 𝜎 would help to distinguish between runs,
the signature scheme could be used to break the pseudorandomness of PRF. Overall, the
probability for A distinguishing the runs is negligible. 
In conclusion, (𝓈,𝓆, (𝒽1),𝓋) is a veri able random oracle with weak unforgeability and







, as stated in theorem 3. We will now
proceed to prove simulation-sound extractability of the Fiat-Shamir transformation when
used with this instantiation.
Theorem 4. The Fiat-Shamir transformation of a strictly sound Σ-protocol with super-
polynomial challenge space is simulation-sound extractable if used with the veri able random
oracle de ned in theorem 3.
The proof for theorem 4 follows the outline presented at the end of section 3.2.
Proof. Let












be a version of 𝒽1 that uses uniform randomness instead of PRF to gain ℎ in line
4,
• Game 0 be Game SSE using VRO,











programming interface) instead of VRO, and
• Game 2 be like Game 1 except A loses when outputting a forged proof.
Any A noticing a di erence between Game 1 and Game 2 could be used to break the
pseudorandomness of PRF. Therefore, the di erence in probabilities of A succeeding
in Game 0 and Game 1 is negligible. VRO′ is a veri able random oracle with weak








reasons as VRO. Because of the weak unforgeability of VRO′ the probability of A acting
di erent in Game 1 and Game 2 is negligible. This also implies the di erence in success






, we can repeat the argumentation for theorem 2 to prove that the Fiat-
Shamir transformation is simulation-sound extractable in Game 2, and therefore in Game
0. 
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3.4 Reducing Trust in Parties
In section 3.3, we have seen how to construct a veri able random oracle using a trusted
party. This is a strong assumption, as trusting a party in this context not only means
trusting it to be honest. It also implies trusting that there will never be any successful
attack against the party. This section introduces the concept of corruption and presents
a veri able random oracle instantiation which is safe as long as no more than one party
is corrupted. We will prove this instantiation is suitable to be used with the Fiat-Shamir
transformation by preserving simulation-sound extractability. Afterwards, we demonstrate
that the instantiation can be generalized to allow up to any number of corrupted parties.
However, this comes with a signi cant increase of needed parties and size of messages.
Corruption Corruption is a tool to model parties getting “hacked” or otherwise compro-
mised. A party corrupted by an adversary shares all information with this adversary. If the
adversary only gets information this way, but does not otherwise in uence the corrupted
party, we speak of passive corruption. If the adversary can control the corrupted party by
dictating its outputs, it is active corruption. For now, we will focus on active corruption. In
settings that allow corruption, security has to be proven for any possible set of corrupted
parties. A party is untrusted, if it is part of any possible set of corrupted parties.
Distributing Functionality A common strategy to tackle the problem of corruption is to
distribute the functionality among multiple parties. We could for example have three
parties implementing the exact same functionality. A query would then consist of separate
queries to each of the parties and use the output given by a majority of the parties. If
a single corrupted party among them changes its output, the majority of outputs and
therefore the e ective value does not change. This naive idea is undesirable for multiple
reasons, as we will soon realize.
Corruption vs. Programming Corruption in the simulation-sound extractability setting
entails an additional challenge: The extractor should be able to program the VRO without
the adversary noticing. Without this ability, simulation-sound extractability cannot be
accomplished. If the extractor changes any output of a corrupted party, the adversary will
notice the programming attempt. Therefore, the extractor has to know which parties are
corrupted. It will gain this information as an additional input.
Finding an Instantiation Distributing functionality by copying it three times fails in our
case. The corrupted party would notice programming attempts as it can compute the
honest output by itself. In fact, any instantiation in which an untrusted party can compute
the honest result alone will fail for this reason. To avoid this problem, we will change
the way we derive the output value. Thus far, given an input 𝑥 , we used a pseudorandom
function PRF to calculate the random value ℎ ← PRF(𝑥). A simple solution to our problem





We then make sure that no party knows all PRF𝑖 , and use the majority for each individual
PRF𝑖 as described before. The minimum number of parties required for this strategy is
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four, as one party is required not to know some PRF𝑖 , and three others are required in
order for majority to work. Let all parties P𝑖 know all pseudorandom functions except
for PRF𝑖 . By giving each P𝑖 a unique signature, and letting them sign (𝑥, PRF𝑛 (𝑥)) for all
𝑛 ≠ 𝑖 , we can make this system veriable. We write 𝑛 ≠ 𝑖 as a shorthand for 𝑛 ∈ {1..4}\{𝑖}
when 𝑛 and 𝑖 are indices of parties.
How to Program It is still possible to freely program this instantiation if only one party
P𝑛 is corrupted. In this case, the extractor can program all other parties to change the
result of PRF𝑛 without P𝑛 noticing. To change the overall output for input 𝑥 to ℎ′, the
extractor can set




We will now give a formal de nition for this instantiation.
Theorem 5 (Distributed Instantiation). Let
• SIG = (Gen, Sign,Vfy) be a EUF-CMA-secure signature scheme,
• PRF be a keyed pseudorandom function,
• Corr ⊆ {1..4} be the indices of all corrupted parties,
• the setup algorithm 𝓈 be de ned as
𝓈():








4 : pk =
(
pkSIG,𝑖
 𝑖 ∈ {1..4})
5 : for 𝑖 ∈ {1..4}:





 𝑛 ≠ 𝑖))
7 : sk =
(
sk𝑖
 𝑖 ∈ {1..4})
8 : return (pk, sk)
,
• the helper algorithm extract, which computes ℎ from 𝜎 , be de ned as
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)  𝑛 ∈ {1..4} ∧ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑛) = 𝜎
2 : for 𝑖 ∈ {1..4}:
3 : if max
ℎ′
{𝑛  VfypkSIG,𝑛 ( (𝑥, ℎ𝑖,𝑛 ), 𝜎𝑖,𝑛 ) ∧ ℎ𝑖,𝑛 = ℎ′} < 2:
4 : return ⊥
5 : ℎ𝑖 = argmax
ℎ′







• the algorithms 𝓆,ℋ = (𝒽𝑛 | 𝑛 ∈ {1..4}), and 𝓋 be de ned as
𝓆pk(𝑥):
1 : for 𝑛 ∈ {1..4}:
2 : 𝜎𝑛 = 𝒽𝑛 (𝑥)
3 : 𝜎 = (𝜎𝑛 | 𝑛 ∈ {1..4})
4 : ℎ = extractpk(𝜎)
5 : return (ℎ, 𝜎)
𝒽𝑛,pk,sk𝑛 (𝑥):
1 : for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑛:
2 : if (𝑖, 𝑥) ∈ mem:
3 : ℎ𝑖,𝑛 = mem[𝑖, 𝑥]
4 : else:
5 : ℎ𝑖,𝑛 = PRFsk𝑖 (𝑥)




)  𝑖 ≠ 𝑛)
𝓋pk(𝑥, ℎ, 𝜎):
1 : ℎ′ = extractpk(𝜎)
2 : return ℎ = ℎ′
,and
• the programming interfaces prgm and PRGM =
(
prgm𝑛
 𝑛 ∈ {1..4}) be de ned as
prgmpk,Corr(𝑥, ℎ′):
1 : if |Corr| > 1:
2 : return ⊥








5 : for 𝑛 ≠ 𝑖 :
6 : prgm𝑛 (𝑖, 𝑥, ℎ′𝑖 )
prgm𝑛,pk,sk𝑛 (𝑖, 𝑥, ℎ
′
𝑖):
1 : mem[𝑖, 𝑥] = ℎ′𝑖
,
where prgm can acquire all ℎ𝑛 values with 𝒽𝑛 (𝑥) queries to uncorrupted parties. Then
(𝓈,𝓆,ℋ,𝓋) is a veri able random oracle with weak unforgeability and suitable programming
interface (prgm, PRGM), if |Corr| ≤ 1.
We will again split theorem 5 into three lemmas.
Lemma 6. VRO = (𝓈,𝓆,ℋ,𝓋) is a veri able random oracle if |Corr| ≤ 1.
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Proof. Let P1 be the only corrupted party without loss of generality, i.e. Corr = {1}. This
implies, that all algorithms except for 𝒽1 behave as dened. Without the programming
interface, the greyed out branch in each 𝒽𝑖 will never be taken. Therefore, for a call
〈𝓆(𝑥),ℋ〉, we have the following knowledge for ℎ𝑖,𝑛 values in 𝜎 :
ℎ1,2 = ℎ1,3 = ℎ1,4 = PRFskPRF,1 (𝑥),
ℎ2,3 = ℎ2,4 = PRFskPRF,2 (𝑥),
ℎ3,2 = ℎ3,4 = PRFskPRF,3 (𝑥), and
ℎ4,2 = ℎ4,3 = PRFskPRF,4 (𝑥).
We also know, that all respective 𝜎𝑖,𝑛 are verifying. Overall, this implies that ℎ returned by
extract is equal to
⊕
𝑖∈{1..4}
PRFskPRF,𝑖 . This is a function, meaning VRO is pseudo deterministic.
As 𝓋 uses the same 𝜎 to extract ℎ′, we know that ℎ = ℎ′, and that VRO is complete. We also
know that the bitwise exclusive OR of pseudorandom functions is itself a pseudorandom
function. Therefore, VRO is pseudorandom, and we can conclude it is a veri able random
oracle. 
Lemma 7. VRO = (𝓈,𝓆,ℋ,𝓋) is weakly unforgeable if |Corr| ≤ 1.
Proof. To forge a new proof 𝜎′, it is necessary to change at least one ℎ𝑖 as calculated in
extract from a known 𝜎 . This requires to change two signatures 𝜎𝑖,𝑎 and 𝜎𝑖,𝑏 for (𝑥, ℎ𝑖).
Let P𝑎 be corrupted by A without loss of generality. If A is successful in breaking the
weak unforgeability of VRO, it can be used to break EUF-CMA of SIG, by forging 𝜎′
𝑖,𝑏
.
This probability is negligible, so A cannot be successful, and we can conclude the weak
unforgeability of VRO. 
Lemma 8. (prgm, PRGM) is a suitable programming interface for (𝓈,𝓆,ℋ,𝓋) in the
simulation-sound extractability setting, if |Corr| ≤ 1.
Proof. Again, let P1 be the only corrupted party without loss of generality. Ext only ever
calls the programming interface for (𝑥, a). Therefore, P𝑖 .mem[1, (𝑥, a)] for 𝑖 ≠ 1 are the
only storage locations used. The only deviations from the original run occur if (𝑥, a) is
queried to any P𝑖 for 𝑖 ≠ 1. This can only in uence the result of 〈𝓆(𝑥, a),ℋ〉. Any other
queries have identical results.
It remains to be shown that A can only distinguish between the initial run and runs
started by Ext with negligible probability. We know that there are no di erences, ex-




PRFskPRF,𝑖 (𝑥, a) as demonstrated before. In a programming call
〈prgm((𝑥, a), ℎ′), PRGM〉, the interface prgm
1
of the corrupted party is never called and
therefore does not give anything away. After a call to 〈prgm((𝑥, a), ℎ′), PRGM〉, we know
about the associated 𝜎 that




PRFskPRF,𝑖 (𝑥, a), and thus,
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〈𝓆(𝑥, a),ℋ〉 = ℎ′ ⊕
⊕
𝑖≠1





This value was drawn with uniform randomness by Ext. Distinguishing it from the honest
output would require breaking the pseudorandomness of
⊕
𝑖∈{1..4}
PRFskPRF,𝑖 (𝑥, a). Overall, the
probability for A to distinguish the runs is negligible. 
In conclusion, (𝓈,𝓆,ℋ,𝓋) is a veri able random oracle with weak unforgeability and
suitable programming interface (prgm, PRGM), as stated by theorem 5. We will now
proceed to prove simulation-sound extractability of the Fiat-Shamir transformation when
used with this instantiation.
Theorem 6. The Fiat-Shamir transformation of a strictly sound Σ-protocol with super-
polynomial challenge space is simulation sound extractable if used with the veri able random
oracle de ned in theorem 5, and at most one party of the oracle is corrupted.
We will once more follow the outline presented at the end of section 3.2 to prove theorem
6.
Proof. Let
• P1 be the only corrupted party without loss of generality,
• VRO = (𝓈,𝓆,ℋ,𝓋) be the veri able random oracle with the programming interface












be a version ofℋ where all parties with access to PRFskPRF,1
use the same uniform randomness instead,
• Game 0 be Game SSE using VRO,
• Game 1 be the same game except it uses VRO′ = (𝓈,𝓆,ℋ′,𝓋) instead of VRO,
• Game 2 be like Game 1 except A loses when outputting a forged proof.
Any A noticing a di erence between Game 0 and Game 1 could be used to break the
pseudorandomness of PRF, speci cally the one used with key skPRF,1. Therefore, the
di erence in probabilities ofA succeeding in Game 0 and Game 1 is negligible. VRO′ is a
veri able random oracle with weak unforgeability and the suitable programming interface
(prgm, PRGM) for the same reasons as VRO. Because of the weak unforgeability of VRO′
the probability of A acting di erently in Game 1 and Game 2 is negligible. This also
implies that the di erence in success probabilities for the two games is negligible. With
the help of suitable behaviour from (prgm, PRGM), we can repeat the argumentation of
theorem 2 to prove that the Fiat-Shamir transformation is simulation-sound extractable in
Game 2, and therefore in Game 0. 
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AnUntrusted Setup The setup algorithm 𝓈 presented in theorem 5 requires a trusted party
to generate and distribute keys. We can replace it with a secure multi-party computation
protocol between all P𝑖 . However, nding a suitable protocol is not the subject of this
thesis.
Timeouts Theorems 5 and 6 still hold if the corrupted party is faulty in some other way.
This includes not answering at all. Remember that we modelled this behaviour with a
special error symbol timeout. As timeout is never valid, all other parties always have a
majority over the faulty one. However, the pseudocode does not re ect this behaviour
explicitly, as error handling would decrease the readability.
Optimizations The instantiation presented in this section can easily be optimized. We
begin with the same trick as in section 3.3 to hash 𝑥 in 𝓆, and use the hashed value
for queries to any 𝒽𝑖 . As before, this change will result in queries with size linear in _,
with negligible security loss. In the next three paragraphs, we reduce the size of 𝜎 by a
signi cant amount.
Redundancy There is a lot of redundant information in 𝜎 : For all 𝑖 , a majority of ℎ𝑖,𝑛 in
any 𝜎 have to be equal to ℎ𝑖 (as computed by extract). Any deviating value will not be
used in the computation of the nal ℎ and could be omitted from 𝜎 . Additionally, two
accepting 𝜎𝑖,𝑛 are enough to con rm any ℎ𝑖 . The third is not needed, regardless if it veri es
or not. Therefore, we can reduce the size of 𝜎 by restructuring it so that it contains each
ℎ𝑖 once, and exactly two accepting signatures for each. This optimization requires the
possibility of requesting only speci c information from each P𝑖 and a much more complex
algorithm 𝓆 to query them. The complexity stems from all the special cases, in which
parties send non-verifying responses.
Coordination We can further optimize scenarios where calls from 𝓆 to any 𝒽𝑖 are more
costly than calls between two parties inℋ. 𝓆 can query the whole 𝜎 from any 𝒽𝑖 , which
in turn requests missing information from the other 𝒽𝑛. The only scenario in which 𝓆
needs to make a second query is if the rst obtained 𝜎 doesn’t verify. This can happen
when making a request to a corrupted or otherwise faulty party.
Aggregate Signatures By using aggregate signatures [7], we can continue to reduce the
size of a result 𝜎 coordinated byℋ and returned to 𝓆 even further. Multiple aggregate
signatures (even of di erent parties and for di erent messages) can be aggregated into a
single signature that is su cient to replace all original signatures. With this optimization,
𝜎 contains only the four ℎ𝑖 values and a single signature, down from twelve ℎ𝑖,𝑛 and twelve
signatures. This step concludes our optimization.
More Corrupted Parties The instantiation in this section can be generalized to be able to
handle up to 𝑛 corrupted parties. We will now compute the total number of parties and
total number of PRFs needed in this situation. For each possible set of corrupted parties,
there has to be a PRF not known by any party in the set. Now there exists a situation in
which all 𝑛 corrupted parties know a concrete PRF. In this scenario, there are still 𝑛 other
parties that do not know PRF. To be able to form a majority against the corrupted parties,
we need another 𝑛 + 1 uncorrupted parties which do know PRF. Therefore, we need a total
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of 3𝑛 + 1 parties if up to 𝑛 parties can be corrupted. The number of PRFs needed is the






𝑛!(2𝑛 + 1)! > 2
𝑛
which is unfortunately super-polynomial in the amount of corrupted parties. This also
increases the size of proofs of correct evaluation accordingly, as all PRF𝑖 values have to
be included. It would be interesting to see if instantiations with less overhead exist for
situations with more corrupted parties.
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4 Conclusion
In this thesis, we have demonstrated that instantiation of random oracles is possible with
the help of interaction. This chapter summarizes what we did in order to achieve this goal.
Verifiable RandomOracles In section 3.1, we introduced a novel ideal model called veri-
able random oracle model which is closely related to the random oracle model. This step
was not necessary to nd an instantiation. However, it helped to reduce the interaction
in protocols instantiating the random oracle, by adding a second oracle to verify random
values gained from the random oracle. Instantiations for this new veri cation oracle can
be non-interactive.
Instantiations In section 3.2, we presented a framework to instantiate veri able random
oracles, and de ned properties we later used in security proofs. We then used this frame-
work to de ne two concrete instantiations. One of them needs only one party, but requires
it to be trusted (section 3.3), the other is secure as long as at most one party is corrupted,
but requires four parties (section 3.4).
Security Throughout the thesis, we have demonstrated the viability of our approach by
proving that it is suitable to be used with the Fiat-Shamir transformation. To be more
accurate, we have proven that versions of the Fiat-Shamir transformation using the ideal
veri able random oracle model, the framework with a variety of assumed properties, the
instantiation with one trusted party, or the distributed instantiation respectively remain
simulation-sound extractable. We are con dent that other properties in other scenarios




[1] Mihir Bellare, Alexandra Boldyreva, andAdriana Palacio. “An uninstantiable random-
oracle-model scheme for a hybrid-encryption problem”. In: International Conference
on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques. Springer, 2004, pp. 171–
188.
[2] Mihir Bellare and Gregory Neven. “Multi-signatures in the plain public-key model
and a general forking lemma”. In: Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer
and communications security. 2006, pp. 390–399.
[3] Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway. “Random oracles are practical: A paradigm for
designing ecient protocols”. In: Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer
and communications security. 1993, pp. 62–73.
[4] Mihir Bellare and Sarah Shoup. “Two-Tier Signatures, Strongly Unforgeable Signa-
tures, and Fiat-Shamir Without Random Oracles”. en. In: Public Key Cryptography –
PKC 2007. Ed. by Tatsuaki Okamoto and Xiaoyun Wang. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2007, pp. 201–216. isbn: 978-3-540-71677-8.
doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-71677-8_14.
[5] Eli Ben-Sasson, Alessandro Chiesa, and Nicholas Spooner. Interactive Oracle Proofs.
Tech. rep. 116. 2016. url: https : / / eprint . iacr . org / 2016 / 116 (visited on
04/03/2020).
[6] David Bernhard, Olivier Pereira, and BogdanWarinschi. “How Not to Prove Yourself:
Pitfalls of the Fiat-Shamir Heuristic and Applications to Helios”. en. In: Advances in
Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2012. Ed. by David Hutchison et al. Vol. 7658. Series Title:
Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2012, pp. 626–643. isbn: 978-3-642-34960-7 978-3-642-34961-4. doi: 10.1007/978-
3-642-34961-4_38. url: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-
4_38 (visited on 07/02/2020).
[7] Dan Boneh et al. “Aggregate and veri ably encrypted signatures from bilinear
maps”. In: International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic
Techniques. Springer, 2003, pp. 416–432.
[8] Jonathan Bootle et al. E cient Zero-Knowledge Arguments for Arithmetic Circuits in
the Discrete Log Setting. Tech. rep. 263. 2016. url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/
263 (visited on 11/04/2020).
[9] Melissa Chase and Anna Lysyanskaya. “Simulatable VRFs with applications to multi-




[10] Ronald Cramer. “Modular design of secure yet practical cryptographic protocols”.
In: Ph. D. Thesis, CWI and University of Amsterdam (1996).
[11] Dana Dachman-Soled, Abhishek Jain, and Yael Tauman Kalai. “On the (In)security
of the Fiat-Shamir Paradigm, Revisited”. en. In: (), p. 27.
[12] Yvo Desmedt, Claude Goutier, and Samy Bengio. “Special Uses and Abuses of the
Fiat-Shamir Passport Protocol (extended abstract)”. en. In: Advances in Cryptology
— CRYPTO ’87. Ed. by Carl Pomerance. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Berlin,
Heidelberg: Springer, 1988, pp. 21–39. isbn: 978-3-540-48184-3. doi: 10.1007/3-540-
48184-2_3.
[13] Yevgeniy Dodis. “Ecient construction of (distributed) veri able random functions”.
In: International Workshop on Public Key Cryptography. Springer, 2003, pp. 1–17.
[14] Jelle Don et al. “Security of the Fiat-Shamir Transformation in the Quantum Random-
Oracle Model”. en. In: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2019. Ed. by Alexandra
Boldyreva and Daniele Micciancio. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Cham:
Springer International Publishing, 2019, pp. 356–383. isbn: 978-3-030-26951-7. doi:
10.1007/978-3-030-26951-7_13.
[15] Sebastian Faust et al. “On the non-malleability of the Fiat-Shamir transform”. In:
International Conference on Cryptology in India. Springer, 2012, pp. 60–79.
[16] Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir. “How To Prove Yourself: Practical Solutions to Iden-
ti cation and Signature Problems”. en. In: Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO’ 86.
Ed. by Andrew M. Odlyzko. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Berlin, Heidelberg:
Springer, 1987, pp. 186–194. isbn: 978-3-540-47721-1. doi: 10.1007/3-540-47721-
7_12.
[17] Marc Fischlin. “Communication-E cient Non-interactive Proofs of Knowledge with
Online Extractors”. en. In: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2005. Ed. by Victor
Shoup. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2005,
pp. 152–168. isbn: 978-3-540-31870-5. doi: 10.1007/11535218_10.
[18] Sha Goldwasser and Yael Tauman Kalai. “On the (in) security of the Fiat-Shamir
paradigm”. In: 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science,
2003. Proceedings. IEEE, 2003, pp. 102–113.
[19] Vandana Gunupudi and Stephen R. Tate. “Random oracle instantiation in distributed
protocols using trusted platform modules”. In: 21st International Conference on
Advanced Information Networking and Applications Workshops (AINAW’07). Vol. 1.
IEEE, 2007, pp. 463–469.
[20] Shai Halevi, Oded Goldreich, and Ran Canetti. The Random Oracle Methodology,
Revisited. Tech. rep. 011. 1998. url: https://eprint.iacr.org/1998/011 (visited
on 04/03/2020).
[21] Dennis Hofheinz and Eike Kiltz. “Programmable Hash Functions and Their Ap-
plications”. en. In: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2008. Ed. by David Wagner.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2008, pp. 21–38.
isbn: 978-3-540-85174-5. doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-85174-5_2.
36
[22] Hans-Joachim Knobloch. “A Smart Card Implementation of the Fiat-Shamir Iden-
tication Scheme”. en. In: Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’88. Ed. by D.
Barstow et al. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 1988,
pp. 87–95. isbn: 978-3-540-45961-3. doi: 10.1007/3-540-45961-8_8.
[23] Neal Koblitz and Alfred J. Menezes. “The random oracle model: a twenty-year
retrospective”. In:Designs, Codes and Cryptography 77.2-3 (2015). Publisher: Springer,
pp. 587–610.
[24] Qipeng Liu and Mark Zhandry. “Revisiting Post-quantum Fiat-Shamir”. en. In: Ad-
vances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2019. Ed. by Alexandra Boldyreva and Daniele
Micciancio. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Cham: Springer International Pub-
lishing, 2019, pp. 326–355. isbn: 978-3-030-26951-7. doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-26951-
7_12.
[25] Silvio Micali, Michael Rabin, and Salil Vadhan. “Veri able random functions”. In:
40th annual symposium on foundations of computer science (cat. No. 99CB37039). IEEE,
1999, pp. 120–130.
[26] Kazuo Ohta and Tatsuaki Okamoto. “A digital multisignature scheme based on
the Fiat-Shamir scheme”. en. In: Advances in Cryptology — ASIACRYPT ’91. Ed. by
Hideki Imai, Ronald L. Rivest, and Tsutomu Matsumoto. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 1993, pp. 139–148. isbn: 978-3-540-48066-2.
doi: 10.1007/3-540-57332-1_11.
[27] Kazuo Ohta, Tatsuaki Okamoto, and Kenji Koyama. “Membership Authentication for
Hierarchical Multigroups Using the Extended Fiat-Shamir Scheme”. en. In: Advances
in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’90. Ed. by Ivan Bjerre Damgård. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 1991, pp. 446–457. isbn: 978-3-540-
46877-6. doi: 10.1007/3-540-46877-3_40.
[28] H. Ong and C. P. Schnorr. “Fast Signature Generation with a Fiat Shamir — Like
Scheme”. en. In: Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’90. Ed. by Ivan Bjerre
Damgård. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 1991,
pp. 432–440. isbn: 978-3-540-46877-6. doi: 10.1007/3-540-46877-3_38.
[29] Dominique Unruh. “Post-quantum Security of Fiat-Shamir”. en. In: Advances in
Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2017. Ed. by Tsuyoshi Takagi and Thomas Peyrin. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017, pp. 65–
95. isbn: 978-3-319-70694-8. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-70694-8_3.
[30] Dominique Unruh. “Quantum proofs of knowledge”. In: Annual international con-
ference on the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques. Springer, 2012,
pp. 135–152.
[31] Brent Waters. “E cient identity-based encryption without random oracles”. In:
Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic
Techniques. Springer, 2005, pp. 114–127.
37
